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The writer is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
作者是卡内基俄罗斯欧亚中心(Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center)高级研究员
Donald Trump’s gleeful “Drill, baby, drill” pledge chimes with the idea of weaponising America’s status as the world’s largest oil producer to strip Russia of the oil revenues funding its war in Ukraine. This line of argument usually has two main points: that the US could flood the market with its crude, driving prices lower and pushing out expensive Russian barrels, and that increased US production could make it possible to embargo and sanction Russian oil exports altogether without causing a shortage and sending prices sky-high.
唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)欢快地提出“钻吧，宝贝，钻吧”的承诺，这与将美国作为世界最大石油生产国的地位武器化的想法相呼应，目的是剥夺俄罗斯用于资助其在乌克兰战争的石油收入。这种论调通常有两个要点：一是美国可以用其原油充斥市场，压低价格并挤掉昂贵的俄罗斯石油；二是美国增加的产量可以使全面禁运和制裁俄罗斯石油出口成为可能，而不会导致短缺和价格飙升。
There is already a wave of scepticism among both oil industry analysts and insiders over the viability of the 3-3-3 economic plan announced by the Treasury secretary nominee Scott Bessent. This includes increasing US oil production by 3mn barrels a day, or an energy equivalent, by 2028. The cost structure of shale oil — the main growth engine of US oil production over the past 15 years — is such that, according to the Dallas Fed, oil producers need on average a forecast of $64 a barrel price to drill a new well. Quite a few existing wells would be shut down if the price falls below $50 a barrel. The government might cut some red tape and make more federal land available for drilling, potentially offering opportunities for more prolific wells with a lower break-even price, but those changes would not have a drastic impact.
石油行业分析师和内部人士对财政部长提名人斯科特•贝森特(Scott Bessent)宣布的3-3-3经济计划的可行性已经产生了怀疑。这项计划包括到2028年将美国石油产量增加到每天300万桶，或能源当量。页岩油是过去15年美国石油产量的主要增长引擎，根据达拉斯联储的数据，其成本结构使得石油生产商平均需要64美元每桶的价格预测来钻一口新井。如果价格跌至50美元每桶以下，许多现有油井将被关闭。政府可能会削减一些繁文缛节，并提供更多联邦土地用于钻探，这可能为更多高产油井提供机会，降低盈亏平衡价格，但这些变化不会产生重大影响。
The irony is that the Biden administration, for all its green measures and talk, has not been too hard on the oil industry, so there is little additional pressure that the Trump administration could remove. Theoretically, it might stimulate additional production by reducing the royalty charged on barrels produced on federal land, but that royalty rate is already much lower than in most of the world. Another possibility would be to offer production-stimulating corporate income tax cuts, but that would contradict other elements of Bessent’s plan. Even if the plan to increase oil production works, its target date of 2028 will certainly not help Trump enact his promise to stop the war in Ukraine during his first weeks in the Oval Office.
具有讽刺意味的是，尽管有各种绿色措施和言论，但拜登政府对石油行业并没有太严厉，因此特朗普政府几乎没有需要消除的额外压力。理论上，它可能会通过降低在联邦土地上生产的石油的特许权使用费来刺激额外的产量，但该特许权使用费率已经远低于世界上大多数地区。另一种可能是提供刺激生产的企业所得税减免，但这与贝森特计划的其他要素相矛盾。即使增加石油产量的计划奏效，其2028年的目标日期肯定不会帮助特朗普兑现他在椭圆形办公室的头几周停止乌克兰战争的承诺。
Oil production growth in most places — Russia included — is usually the result of activities performed and planned long before the fact, during the fat years. Today, Russia does not have many sources for continuing oil production growth: most new projects have been mothballed since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russia might even struggle to maintain a plateau once it eats through the inventory of the approximately 1mn-barrel-a-day spare capacity that was taken offline under Opec+ agreements.
包括俄罗斯在内的大多数地方的石油产量增长通常是在丰年之前很久就进行和计划的活动的结果。如今，俄罗斯没有太多保持石油产量增长的来源：自2022年全面入侵乌克兰以来，大多数新项目都被搁置了。一旦俄罗斯耗尽了欧佩克+协议下每天约100万桶的闲置产能，它甚至可能难以维持稳定的产量。
But it would not cost much for Russia to maintain a manageable decline of 2-3 per cent a year. By some estimates, the average cost of producing, processing and transporting the oil to export terminals from the existing wells in today’s Russia is $11-$12 a barrel, and $17 a barrel with drilling and development costs within existing fields. That has been creeping up with inflation, but it is mostly rouble-based, so a weakening rouble drives dollar costs lower. Even assuming that the US plan works and the US and Saudi Arabia agree to bring prices below $50 a barrel, it is unlikely that this would make Russia curtail its oil production.
但俄罗斯要保持每年2-3%的可控下降，并不需要付出太多代价。据估计，在今天的俄罗斯，从现有油井生产、加工和运输石油到出口码头的平均成本为每桶11-12美元，在现有油田内的钻井和开发成本为每桶17美元。这一数字一直在随着通胀攀升，但主要是以卢布为基础的，因此卢布走软会降低美元成本。即使假设美国的计划奏效，美国和沙特阿拉伯同意将油价降至每桶50美元以下，这也不太可能使俄罗斯削减石油产量。
It’s true that the country’s trade balance would suffer in such a situation: a $10-a-barrel change in the export price translates to $25bn a year, but that is less than 7 per cent of total Russian exports and even less than the annual current account surplus now. There will be extra losses from gas trade, as gas prices in Chinese contracts are linked to the oil price, but the volumes are far smaller.
确实，在这种情况下，该国的贸易平衡将受到影响：出口价格每桶变化10美元，意味着每年损失250亿美元，但这还不到俄罗斯总出口的7%，甚至比现在的年度经常账户盈余还要少。由于中国合同中的天然气价格与石油价格挂钩，天然气贸易也会有额外损失，但其数量要小得多。
Nor will the hoped-for 3mn barrels per day of additional US production be enough to replace the 7mn currently exported by Russia. As a result, it would still be very disruptive to try to embargo Russian oil from the world markets altogether. That strategy mostly worked with Iran in 2018, but there were only 3mn barrels of export volumes to replace. Russia plays a much bigger role in the global oil markets and there is no quick fix that can change that, even if everything goes according to Trump’s very ambitious plans and campaign trail promises.
即使美国希望的每天300万桶的增产，也不足以替代俄罗斯目前出口的700万桶。因此，试图全面禁止俄罗斯石油进入世界市场仍将造成很大的破坏。2018年，该策略对伊朗基本奏效，但当时只需替代300万桶的出口量。俄罗斯在全球石油市场中扮演着更重要的角色，即使一切都按照特朗普非常雄心勃勃的计划和竞选承诺进行，也没有快速解决方案可以改变这一点。
Since the beginning of the war, the west has managed to put a dent in Russia’s oil revenues, but it is now struggling to reduce them further. So far, Trump and his associates have not produced a plausible breakthrough strategy for the short to medium term. It is accordingly wise to design plans and strategies regarding Russia around the assumption that its oil revenues remain quite resilient and cannot be drastically reduced.
自战争开始以来，西方已经成功减少了俄罗斯的石油收入，但现在很难进一步减少。到目前为止，特朗普及其伙伴尚未提出一个在短期到中期内可行的突破性策略。因此，围绕俄罗斯设计计划和策略时，明智的做法是假设其石油收入仍然相当有韧性，无法被大幅削减。