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The writer is former chief of MI6 and UK ambassador to the UN
本文作者曾任军情六处处长和英国驻联合国大使
In the past two weeks, Israel has used its huge military advantage, underpinned by AI-enhanced intelligence, to overwhelm Hizbollah. The organisation has lost its top leadership and many of the next generation. Its communications system has been destroyed, as have many of its rocket and missile launch sites. This comes after Hamas’s military capacity has been largely dismantled.
在过去的两周里，以色列利用其由AI增强的情报支持的巨大军事优势，以压倒性的力量击败了黎巴嫩真主党(Hizbollah)。该组织失去了最高领导层和许多下一代成员。其通信系统已被摧毁，许多火箭和导弹发射基地也被摧毁。这是在哈马斯(Hamas)的军事能力被大部分瓦解之后发生的。
It feels like we are witnessing a substantial shift in the balance of power in the Middle East, in Israel’s favour and at Iran’s expense.
我们似乎正在目睹中东力量平衡发生重大转变，这对以色列有利，对伊朗不利。
Since Hamas’s brutal October 7 assault a year ago, Iran has been loud on rhetoric but has done little of substance to protect the militias it helped build up. In his UN speech, President Masoud Pezeshkian put the priority on lifting sanctions — a goal diametrically opposed to getting involved on Hizbollah’s behalf. Iran’s vice-president for strategic affairs, Mohammad Javad Zarif, said recently that supporting the Palestinians didn’t mean going to war for them. Iran seems cowed, lacking the will and military capacity to respond and not prepared to risk instability at home as it enters an uncertain leadership transition.
自从哈马斯去年10月7日的残酷袭击以来，伊朗在言辞上很响亮，但在保护其帮助建立的民兵方面却几乎没有实质性的行动。在联合国演讲中，伊朗总统马苏德•佩泽什基安将重点放在解除制裁上，这与代表黎巴嫩真主党的立场截然相反。伊朗战略事务副总统穆罕默德•贾瓦德•扎里夫最近表示，支持巴勒斯坦人并不意味着为他们而战。伊朗似乎被吓住了，缺乏意愿和军事能力作出回应，也不愿冒着国内不稳定的风险，因为它正在进入一个不确定的领导过渡期。
Israel has smelled the weakness in Tehran and is driving home its advantage. No one should feel sorry for Hizbollah — for over 40 years, it has used violence to accumulate power in Lebanon. Those who live by the sword die by the sword.
以色列已经嗅到了德黑兰的弱点，并正在充分利用这一优势。没有人应该为黎巴嫩真主党感到遗憾——40多年来，它一直通过暴力在黎巴嫩积累权力。那些以剑为生的人，终将死于剑下。
How will Hizbollah respond now it has been brought to its knees? It still has the much-vaunted precision missiles which could strike at Israeli cities. Iran may be holding Hizbollah back as these were provided as a deterrent against an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. We don’t know if Iran has a dual key over their use. But if Israel starts to destroy the missile arsenal then Hizbollah may face a “use it or lose it” moment.
黎巴嫩真主党现在已经被逼到绝境，它将如何回应？它仍然拥有可以打击以色列城市的备受吹捧的精确导弹。伊朗可能在阻止黎巴嫩真主党使用这些导弹，因为这些武器是作为对以色列袭击伊朗核设施的威慑力量提供的。我们不知道伊朗是否对这些导弹的使用有双重控制权。但如果以色列开始摧毁导弹库，那么黎巴嫩真主党可能会面临“要么使用，要么失去”的时刻。
Widespread Israeli civilian deaths would probably trigger a ground invasion by Israel, which some in Hizbollah might relish — a chance to even the scores in the hostile terrain Israeli forces would have to advance through. For that reason, Benjamin Netanyahu would probably prefer to keep his troops on Israel’s side of the border rather than marching to Beirut’s southern suburbs and to the Bekaa Valley where Hizbollah’s most deadly missiles are probably located. A more limited advance to the Litani River is possible but would leave Israel half in and half out, with no exit strategy.
以色列平民的广泛死亡可能会引发以色列的地面入侵，这对黎巴嫩真主党中的一些人来说可能是一个机会——以色列军队将不得不在敌对地形中前进，从而扳回局面。因此，本雅明•内塔尼亚胡(Benjamin Netanyahu)可能更愿意将部队留在以色列边境的一侧，而不是向贝鲁特的南郊和贝卡谷地(Bekaa Valley)进军，那里可能是黎巴嫩真主党最致命的导弹所在地。更有限的推进到利塔尼河(Litani River)是可能的，但这将使以色列处于进退两难的境地，没有退出策略。
An alternative path for Hizbollah would be a resort to international terrorism. When well-organised regional groups lose their leadership, a more extreme and violent entity can take their place. Isis emerged after more sophisticated opposition groups in Iraq and Syria were dismantled. Killing seasoned political leaders like Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas’s Ismail Haniyeh is a gamble for Israel but one it seems ready for.
黎巴嫩真主党的另一条道路是诉诸国际恐怖主义。当组织严密的地区组织失去领导时，一个更加极端和暴力的实体就会取而代之。伊拉克和叙利亚境内更复杂的反对派组织被瓦解后，伊斯兰国(Isis)便应运而生。杀死像哈桑•纳斯鲁拉和哈马斯的伊斯梅尔•哈尼亚(Ismail Haniyeh)这样经验丰富的政治领导人对以色列来说是一场赌博，但以色列似乎已经做好了准备。
Tough military action against Iranian-backed militias dovetails neatly with Israel’s politics, which lean further and further to the right. Enduring stability for Israel will ultimately only come with a political solution in the region. But the same domestic dynamics that are driving Netanyahu to press home Israel’s advantage make a broader political settlement more distant. The best time to engage in a political process is when you are strong and your enemies are weak. But the make-up of Israel’s ruling coalition makes a political initiative with the divided and badly led Palestinians hard to conceive.
对伊朗支持的民兵采取强硬军事行动与以色列的政治立场完美契合，后者越来越倾向于右翼。以色列的持久稳定最终只能通过地区内的政治解决方案实现。然而，推动内塔尼亚胡利用以色列的优势的国内动态使更广泛的政治解决方案变得更加遥远。参与政治进程的最佳时机是在你强大而敌人虚弱的时候。然而，以色列执政联盟的构成使得与分裂且领导不善的巴勒斯坦人进行政治倡议难以设想。
It is usually the Americans who try to midwife political progress in the region. But the Biden administration’s power — never very strong in the Middle East — is wilting. It takes months for a new administration to decide on its priorities, and the approaches of Donald Trump and Kamala Harris would be very different. Meanwhile, the Middle East will remain tense and volatile.
通常是美国人试图在该地区推动政治进展。但是拜登政府在中东地区的影响力——从来都不是很强大——正在减弱。新政府需要几个月的时间来确定其优先事项，唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)和卡玛拉•哈里斯(Kamala Harris)的方法将大不相同。与此同时，中东局势将继续紧张和动荡。
One actor we have heard little from in the past year is Syria. The Syrian regime used to be the arbiter in Lebanon and was willing to kill any Lebanese politician who didn’t bow to diktats from Damascus. The regime is now much weaker after the civil war and Bashar al-Assad is not a patch on his father when it comes to political power plays. But Syria remains relevant as an ally of Iran, Russia and Hizbollah, and a crucial link in Hizbollah’s supply chain.
过去一年我们很少听到叙利亚的声音。叙利亚政权曾经是黎巴嫩的仲裁者，并愿意杀死任何不服从大马士革命令的黎巴嫩政治家。经过内战，叙利亚政权现在变得更加薄弱，阿萨德在政治权力斗争方面不如他的父亲。但叙利亚作为伊朗、俄罗斯和黎巴嫩真主党的盟友，以及黎巴嫩真主党供应链中的关键环节，仍然具有重要意义。
Although Hizbollah helped the Assad regime survive in 2013-14, Damascus will want to stay aligned with Iran if it can. It also has bitter memories of the 1982 Lebanon war when the Syrian air force intervened only to be destroyed by Israel. With Iran and Syria focused on their own issues, only the distant Houthis seem up for attacking Israel, so far to little effect. This may be the start of the final chapter for the Axis of Resistance.
尽管黎巴嫩真主党在2013-2014年帮助阿萨德政权幸存下来，但如果可能的话，大马士革仍希望与伊朗保持一致。它还对1982年黎巴嫩战争怀有痛苦的记忆，当时叙利亚空军介入，却被以色列摧毁。由于伊朗和叙利亚专注于自身问题，迄今为止，只有遥远的胡塞武装似乎有攻击以色列的意愿，但效果甚微。这可能是抵抗轴心最后一章的开始。